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The inaugural annual national forum on the 2016 New 
Zealand Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code took place 
in July 2017 in Wellington. The 2016 code replaced a code 
originally put in place in 2004. Participants in the forum 
included the 2016 code partners: port companies, regional 
councils/unitary authorities, Maritime New Zealand, as well 
as maritime industry representatives, and other government 
agencies with an interest in maritime safety. The forum 
represented an important waypoint in the journey from the 
development, implementation and review of the 2004 code, 
to the development and implementation of the 2016 code as 
a key part of the regulatory system that seeks to manage port 
and harbour risks.
Zealand’s ports and harbours (Ministry 
of Transport, 2007, p.7). While the 
2004 code was well intentioned and 
created some improvement in the safety 
management culture in New Zealand’s 
ports and harbours, over time concerns 
emerged about its relevance, effectiveness 
and efficiency as a way of managing 
successfully the risks it was intended to 
deal with.  
These concerns were addressed by 
establishing the 2016 code as part of a co-
regulatory mechanism which is defined 
by a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) (Maritime New Zealand, 2017a) 
signed by representatives of port 
companies, councils and Maritime New 
Zealand. While not legally binding, the 
MoU commits the parties to principles of 
tripartite joint ownership of the 2016 
code, voluntary adoption of mutually 
agreed standards, collaboration, 
commitment of human resources to 
support delivery of an agreed work plan, 
information sharing, and joint funding of 
a secretariat. The 2016 code establishes 
clear responsibilities and accountabilities 
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The 2004 code was put in place following 
a series of shipping incidents in 2002–
03, including a serious incident in the 
Gisborne port involving the Jody F 
Millennium. That ship grounded and 
the subsequent investigation highlighted 
the need for improved regulatory 
arrangements to manage risks in New 
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which operate in addition to the core 
regulatory framework that underpins 
safety in the port and harbour 
environment. The MoU is clear that there 
is no constraint on the ability of councils 
or Maritime New Zealand carrying out 
their regulatory functions.  
This article is a case study of the 
journey that led to the forum. It introduces 
co-regulation as a regulatory mechanism, 
canvasses why ports and harbours need to 
be regulated and identifies the key players 
in the regulatory system. It describes the 
journey to the development of a co-
regulatory approach in which there is 
active acceptance of shared accountability 
for delivering agreed outcomes. It 
concludes with reference to the key design 
features of the co-regulatory mechanism 
and views of its effectiveness in the context 
of good regulatory practice. 
In addition to being a case study of the 
journey to co-regulation, it is a story of 
central and local government agencies 
working together effectively to address 
risks of national significance. 
Co-regulation
Referring to co-regulation as a mechanism 
is consistent with its position as part 
of a taxonomy of the available forms 
of regulation as discussed by Freiberg 
(2010); and it reflects the generally 
understood description of co-regulation 
as involving industry and government 
(the regulator) collaborating to develop 
and administer arrangements that address 
an area of risk, with those arrangements 
accompanied by a ‘legislative backstop’, as 
discussed by Compliance Experts (n.d.) 
and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
(1997). Co-regulation sits on a spectrum 
of regulatory mechanisms which goes 
from full government regulation, through 
co-regulation, to self-regulation, with 
each involving more or less government 
intervention, as set out by Allen+Clarke 
(2012). In essence co-regulation has 
features of both government regulation 
and self-regulation.
Within each mechanism there is also a 
spectrum of ‘levels’ of government 
intervention. For example, the gas 
industry in New Zealand is regulated 
through a co-regulatory mechanism. That 
mechanism is established through 
legislation. The body responsible for its 
implementation (the Gas Industry 
Company Limited) is a formally 
constituted ‘industry body’ under the 
terms of the Gas Act 1992. However, the 
port and harbour safety co-regulatory 
mechanism is an entirely voluntary 
arrangement which involves government 
(both central and local) and industry 
establishing an MoU, developing a code, 
and putting in place an implementation 
body and process. This mechanism 
operates in addition to core legal 
requirements relating to safety and 
environmental protection in the port and 
harbour environment. Effectively, the 
code adds value by providing guidance 
and support to parties with accountabilities 
and responsibilities under the law. 
Why ports and harbours need to be 
regulated 
In her keynote speech to the inaugural 
national forum, Belinda Vernon, deputy 
chair of the Maritime New Zealand 
Authority,1 said:
New Zealand’s economy relies on the 
safe operation of our ports and 
harbours. With more than 99% of 
exports and imports by volume 
moving through our ports, safety of 
shipping in New Zealand ports and 
harbours is essential. It is important 
not only economically but also in 
terms of potential risk to life, 
property and environment from a 
serious shipping accident.
Weather events, larger vessels, 
more cruise ships, changing 
technology and conflicts between 
commercial and recreational use, all 
contribute to the changing marine 
operating environment, creating 
challenges and opportunities. 
Managing the risks associated with 
these is paramount. (Vernon, 2017)
While this was a statement related to 
the 2016 code, it describes well the nature 
of activity and risks associated with ports 
and harbours. This does not in itself mean 
that regulation is required to manage 
those risks. 
Box 1: History and role of pilots  
and  pilotage
In its article ‘History of maritime pilots’, the French maritime pilots’ federa-
tion notes that pilots have a long maritime history, starting around the time the 
exchange of goods began in the Mediterranean basin, and reference to the term 
pilot (as a guide of the ship) appeared in Ezekiel’s book in the 6th century BC2 
(Fédération Française des Pilotes Maritimes, 2017). The article notes that the 
ancestor of the maritime pilot can also be found in the travel literature, in a book 
called Periplus of Erythraean Sea, written in the 1st century AD. Fast forward to 
the 17th century and it is noted that ‘In Europe, since the beginning of the 17th 
century, the pilotage is regulated in all the countries by national laws, called 
“Pilotage Acts”, and by local regulations of ports, fixing the professional status of 
the pilots in each country.’
      In New Zealand, in 1842 a Harbour Regulations Ordinance was issued, 
divided into four parts: pilots and pilotage; quarantine; harbour regulations; and 
penalties. The modern version of this ordinance is the Maritime Rules, part 90: 
pilotage, the objective of which is to maintain the contribution of pilotage to the 
safety of navigation, the protection of the marine environment and the efficiency 
of seaborne commerce, set minimum national standards while enabling port-spe-
cific risks to be addressed, provide a licensing regime for pilots and pilotage-ex-
empt masters within the maritime document provisions of the Maritime Transport 
Act 1994, recognise and support industry best practice, and ensure the provision 
of pilotage services.
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In plain terms, the rationale for 
regulation is that the risks won’t be 
managed effectively if users are left to 
their own devices. The regulatory impact 
statement supporting changes to port and 
harbour safety regulation in 2013 
(Ministry of Transport 2008) referred to 
the series of incidents that occurred in 
2002-03. Those incidents revealed a 
pattern of failures in port safety 
governance and operational procedures 
(not only confined to ports where 
incidents had occurred) that supported 
the need for regulation. 
Key players in the port and harbour 
regulatory system
Port companies, councils and Maritime 
New Zealand are all involved directly 
and/or indirectly in the regulatory system 
that applies to ports and harbours. Two 
of the primary means of addressing risks 
in the port and harbour environment 
are through the functions of pilots and 
harbourmasters, who are employed by 
port companies and councils respectively. 
Maritime New Zealand has regulatory 
oversight of safety and environmental 
matters, and pilotage and harbourmaster 
functions, through the Maritime 
Transport Act 1994. 
Port companies came into being as a 
result of the Port Companies Act 1988, the 
purpose of which is to promote and 
improve efficiency, economy and 
performance in the management and 
operation of the commercial aspects of 
ports. This gives a clue to their primary 
focus being to operate commercially, not 
to operate as regulators. Port companies 
are generally owned (in full or in part) by 
councils, but operate at arm’s length. Port 
companies employ, or contract, pilots to 
assist in guiding ships into harbours. 
Pilots are service providers, not regulators. 
Box 1 sets out briefly the history and role 
of pilots.
Councils’ responsibilities are set out in 
the Maritime Transport Act 1994 
(following amendment in 2013) and 
include harbour navigation and safety, oil 
spills and other issues related to marine 
pollution. They are effectively the ‘local’ 
regulators in the port and harbour 
environment, with the ability to set by-
laws to manage a prescribed set of local 
navigation safety issues. Their 
responsibilities in this area are typically 
met through employing harbourmasters 
(or contracting the provision of 
harbourmaster services). While 
harbourmasters provide services, they are 
regulators. Box 2 sets out briefly the 
history and role of harbourmasters.
In some cases harbourmaster services 
are provided by port company employees. 
For example, in Nelson the harbourmaster 
is also the marine operations manager for 
Port Nelson, and a pilot in that port and 
region. In Taranaki a similar situation 
exists, with the harbourmaster function 
being undertaken by the port marine 
operations manager. As these combined 
functions may be perceived as involving 
conflicts of interest, arrangements are in 
place involving deputy harbourmasters to 
ensure that functionally independent 
decision making occurs where necessary. 
Maritime New Zealand’s 
responsibilities include taking action in 
situations where port management poses 
a significant risk to the safety of shipping 
and, potentially, to the marine 
environment. This is done through legally 
enforceable interventions, should such 
action prove necessary. Maritime New 
Zealand also employs the harbourmaster 
for the port at Taharoa, which is an 
offshore terminal used for loading 
ironsands onto purpose-built vessels. 
The regulatory system in respect to 
ports and harbours is somewhat complex. 
Given the integrated nature of the roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities, it is 
apparent that clarity between parties, 
supported by good communication and 
cooperation, is necessary for the system to 
work effectively. This provides fertile 
ground for a well-designed co-regulatory 
mechanism.
The journey to a co-regulatory approach
The journey towards today’s co-regulatory 
approach began with the Transport 
Accident Investigation Commission and 
the Maritime Safety Authority (as of 2005 
Box 2: History and role of 
harbourmasters
According to Captain Rinze K. Mast, writing in Port Technology International 
(n.d.):
The office of harbour master can be traced back to 317 BC at least. It 
was in that year that a Cyprian businessman, with the name of Zeno of 
Citium (c.336-c.264 BC), encountered a storm off the port of Athens, 
Greece. As at that time Zeno could not avail himself of the services of 
an Athenian Harbour Coordination Centre he was shipwrecked near 
the port entrance and was rescued by a bookseller, who also held the 
post of harbour master and bath-superintendent. … In more recent 
years the harbour master’s office can be traced back to The Nether-
lands, Middelburg 1513 and Rotterdam 1554, the United Kingdom, 
Bristol 1669, and Belgian Ports about 1800. (Mast, n.d.)3
Closer to home, Maritime New Zealand’s history timeline on its website records 
that in 1841 Auckland’s first harbourmaster was appointed.
       While the legislative underpinnings for harbourmaster functions referred 
to above are not clear, today in New Zealand the role of the harbourmaster is 
defined by reference to the functions and powers set out in the Maritime Trans-
port Act 1994, sections 33E and 33F (as amended in 2013). In summary, a 
harbourmaster’s purpose is to ensure maritime safety in relation to ports, har-
bours or waters for which he or she has been appointed as a harbourmaster by 
a regional council. The harbourmaster has a variety of powers to achieve this, 
including giving directions regarding navigation practices and ships’ masters’ 
actions in respect to ship movements, and regulating and controlling traffic and 
navigation in certain circumstances. 
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Maritime New Zealand) investigations of 
the Jody F Millennium and other incidents 
in 2002–03. Those investigations 
identified a pattern of problems, and 
noted that the current arrangements 
did not deliver sufficient rigour and 
consistency in port and harbour safety 
management. The statutory powers (the 
‘legislative backstop’) available to deal 
with these systemic problems were not 
considered to be of much use in doing so 
(Ministry of Transport, 2007, p.7). 
The Maritime Safety Authority 
recommended the development of a 
national port safety code, modeled on the 
United Kingdom Port and Marine Safety 
Code, or the making of maritime rules to 
the same effect. However, the Maritime 
Transport Act 1994 did not provide any 
statutory authority for a mandatory code 
of the type proposed, so it would only be 
possible to establish such a code as an 
administrative measure, with voluntary 
compliance (ibid.). Thus, in consultation 
with industry, local government and 
relevant central government organisations, 
the 2004 code was developed. It was 
accompanied by guidelines covering 
matters such as port and harbour risk 
assessments and safety management 
systems, hydrographic surveys, aids to 
navigation, power line waterway crossings, 
environmental factors and aquaculture 
areas and marine farms. There was no 
body with any formal underpinnings 
(either legislative or voluntary) established 
to oversee its implementation, and much 
of the responsibility sat with the Maritime 
Safety Authority.
Harry Duynhoven, minister of 
transport at the time, in a speech to the 
National Ports Forum on 23 November 
2004 made the following comments: 
The Code and Guidelines have been a 
big step forward for improvements to 
the safety of maritime operations for 
ports and harbours.
The new Code specifies the 
responsibilities of all participants in 
the port and harbour system 
including regional councils, territorial 
authorities, port companies, and the 
MSA.
The Guidelines provide a clear 
steer on best practice for 
implementing measures for risk 
assessment, hydrographic surveys, 
aids to navigation, and environmental 
factors affecting safe access and 
operations in ports and harbours.
In terms of timings, 
implementation of the Code has 
already begun. Although the code is 
voluntary:
•	 Regional	councils	are	being	asked	
to complete harbour risk 
assessments by June 2005 which 
will include an assessment of 
port-related marine operations in 
their region.
•	 Once	MSA	has	signed	off	on	these	
risk assessments, councils are will 
move toward developing safety 
management plans by June 2006 
which will be reviewed and 
approved by MSA.
MSA will then periodically audit 
harbour safety management systems 
to ensure compliance.
Over	the	next	two	years,	MSA	has	
programmed further work on 
Code-related guidelines and 
competency standards, covering vessel 
traffic services and harbourmasters. 
(Duynhoven, 2004)
It might be thought that this 2004 
approach was essentially a co-regulatory 
mechanism (i.e. involving industry and 
government (the regulator) collaborating 
to develop and administer arrangements 
that address an area of risk). However, the 
comment ‘Although the code is voluntary’ 
followed by the list of steps required, and 
the positioning of the Maritime Safety 
Authority as signing off on risk 
assessments, periodically auditing 
harbour safety management plans and 
developing guidelines, challenges whether 
this was the case. In effect a regulatory 
mechanism had been put in place that was 
intended to operate through cooperation 
and be voluntary, but the authority’s 
position as the ‘owner’ of the code 
(Ministry of Transport, 2007, p.8) and the 
responsibilities it held were essentially the 
same as those that applied in its statutory 
regulatory function. This meant that its 
true character was not one of co-
regulation. In retrospect it might be 
thought of as imposed self-regulation, 
which is neither government regulation, 
co-regulation nor self-regulation as those 
mechanisms are generally understood. 
Another key aspect of the minister’s 
speech was its announcing that:
A law review, programmed for the 
coming year, will consider what new 
or amended legislation is required to 
support the implementation and 
ongoing development of the safety 
system. A review of maritime rules 
dealing with pilotage will follow the 
completion of regional risk 
assessments and safety management 
systems.
Ultimately, the review Duynhoven 
referred to didn’t commence until 2007. 
However, this statement tended to support 
the possibility that the code could be 
made mandatory at some point. 
Indeed, Maritime New Zealand 
expressed the view in response to the 
Ministry of Transport’s 2007 Port and 
Harbour and Navigation Safety 
Management discussion document 
(Ministry of Transport, 2007) that a lack 
of legislative backing for the code left the 
system with an inherent weakness. 
However, changes to the Maritime 
In retrospect it might be thought of as 
imposed self-regulation, which is neither 
government regulation, co-regulation nor 
self-regulation as those mechanisms are 
generally understood.
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Transport Act 1994 that did occur finally 
in 2013 did not provide specifically for a 
mandatory code. Those changes did 
improve the ‘legislative backstop’ by 
introducing what the minister for building 
and construction, Maurice Williamson, 
on behalf of the minister of transport 
referred to in Parliament as: 
measures that specify the maritime 
safety responsibilities of port 
operators and the related powers of 
the Director of Maritime New 
Zealand to intervene in the interests 
of maritime safety. These measures 
will support and complement the 
voluntary New Zealand Port and 
Harbour Marine Safety Code 2004. 
(Williamson, 2013)
Maritime New Zealand’s environmental 
scan – the platform for a true co-regulatory 
approach
As these legislative changes were emerging, 
progress with the implementation of the 
2004 code was increasingly a topic of 
discussion in the maritime community. 
There were concerns about the level of 
attention being paid to it. In particular, 
discussion of concerns at a 2013 meeting 
of the Harbourmasters’ Special Interest 
Group4 triggered Maritime New Zealand 
to step back and consider the future of the 
2004 code. 
An example of the basis for the concerns 
was that, as of late 2013, despite the original 
intentions associated with the introduction 
of the 2004 code, while Maritime New 
Zealand had approved safety management 
systems in eight ports and harbours, nine 
ports and harbours were still without safety 
management system approval. The 
majority of the nine had submitted 
documents to Maritime New Zealand, but 
there was uncertainty about the status of 
the safety management system documents 
in some cases (i.e. whether they were at a 
standard that could be approved). The 
reality of this was that Maritime New 
Zealand had not prioritised resources to 
fulfil the role it had under the code. 
Maritime New Zealand has a broad remit 
and other priorities constantly emerged. 
With the 2004 code work not being part of 
its formal regulatory role, that work did not 
have a funding stream to support it. Given 
that it was anticipated that a proper review 
and approval process took about 8–10 days 
of one person’s time, this was not an 
insignificant matter (Ministry of Transport, 
2007, p.21). This situation was far from 
satisfactory in terms of having appropriate 
levels of documentation and assurance of 
safety management systems, as was 
intended by the 2004 code. 
However, the view was widely held 
that the advent of the 2004 code had 
brought about a culture of systems-based 
risk assessment and safety management in 
New Zealand’s ports and harbours, and 
there were good examples of this.5 For 
example, whether or not all safety 
management systems had been reviewed 
and approved by Maritime New Zealand, 
as compared to the situation in 2004, 
safety management systems did exist in all 
of New Zealand’s ports and harbours; and 
some regional councils and ports had 
strong and functional port and harbour 
safety meetings that drove collaborative 
decision making around safety matters. 
Following internal consideration of 
the future of the code, Maritime New 
Zealand, through a joint Maritime New 
Zealand/regional council steering group 
that operates to address matters of 
common interest, commenced an 
environmental scan6 to determine how 
relevant, effective, efficient and equitable 
the code remained. The environmental 
scan also addressed whether the port and 
harbour community considered the code 
should remain voluntary.7 A representative 
of the Port Company Chief Executive 
Group8 was also invited to take part in 
overseeing this scan. Ultimately, the 
collective leadership shown by this 
oversight group was an important 
contributor to the success of the review of 
the 2004 code and development of the co-
regulatory mechanism and 2016 code, and 
this continues to be the case.
The scan confirmed that, as discussed 
above, while the development and 
implementation of the 2004 code might 
on the face of it appear to be an example 
of co-regulation, in comparison with the 
2016 approach that would emerge this 
was not really the case. 
Findings of the environmental scan
The findings of the scan were reported in 
February 2014 (Maritime New Zealand, 
Table 1: Key findings of the environmental scan
dimension Key findings in relation to the code
Relevance The code remained relevant but needed refreshing to renew sector 
commitment to the process and position of the code, and to strengthen 
nationally consistent safety management practices.
    Use of the word ‘approval’ in respect to Maritime New Zealand’s role 
in confirming that a safety management system met code requirements 
appeared to confuse accountability for safety outcomes. 
Effectiveness The code was an effective catalyst for establishing a culture of 
safety management, and in some regions the level of enthusiasm for 
collaboratively developing a safety culture was obvious.
    There were strong indicators, but insufficient evidence, to conclude that 
the code had delivered a consistent standard of port and harbour safety 
management across New Zealand.
    Maritime New Zealand’s inability to resource its code implementation 
role had compromised effectiveness.
Efficiency The leadership qualities and maritime knowledge of harbourmasters had 
a bearing on how efficiently code implementation occurred at the regional 
level.
    Maritime New Zealand’s inability to resource its code implementation 
role had compromised efficiency.
Equity Councils vary in size and rating base and some found the financial 
and human resource requirements to meet their obligations were quite 
onerous.
Status The weight of opinion was strongest towards maintaining a voluntary 
code. Some smaller councils thought making it mandatory would ensure 
that it was prioritised at the local level.
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2014) according to the key dimensions 
of: relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; 
equity; and status. These findings 
identified key matters that would need 
to be addressed to make a refreshed 
approach successful. They also provided 
a platform for establishing a truly co-
regulatory mechanism. The key findings 
are summarised in Table 1.
Consideration of the findings led to a 
set of recommendations that were 
accepted by the joint oversight group and 
informed the development of the co-
regulatory mechanism that is now in place 
(including the 2016 code). The 
recommendations, elaborated in Table 2, 
were:
1. Address outstanding safety 
management system (SMS) ‘approvals’, 
to demonstrate that a high level of 
safety management existed nationally.
2. Revive and strengthen joint 
commitment of the port and harbour 
marine safety code, with the clear 
desire for it to be voluntary and 
provide a national safety standard.
3. Update the code and supporting 
guidelines, to reflect changes to the 
law, and provide for a style that was 
less prescriptive than the original 
code and able to accommodate a 
broader concept of best practice risk 
assessment and safety management 
practice.
4. Improve the code’s operational 
efficiency, to minimise the compliance 
burden while maintaining the 
integrity of the ‘approval and audit’ 
system.
5. Collect and communicate evidence of 
the code’s effectiveness, to provide for 
statistical trend analysis of port and 
harbour accidents and incidents, 
provide data to champion the 
effective implementation of the code, 
and support an annual meeting that 
would provide for sharing of 
information, learning lessons and 
continually improving.
Key design features of the co-regulatory 
mechanism
Action on recommendation 1 set the 
scene for key design features for the co-
regulatory mechanism that now exists. 
As indicated in the introduction, the 
key design features are: a tripartite 
memorandum of understanding; joint 
ownership of the 2016 code, with clear 
objectives; voluntarily adopted and 
mutually agreed standards; commitment 
of human resources to support delivery of 
an agreed work plan; information sharing; 
and joint funding of a secretariat. 
Effectiveness of this approach
The annual report of the New Zealand 
Port and Harbour Marine Safety Code 
(Maritime New Zealand, 2017b) included 
the following statement from the code 
steering group:
The Code stakeholders can be assured 
of the effectiveness of the voluntary 
approach to the 2016 Code. In order 
to test the level of satisfaction with 
Code progress and performance, we 
consulted with the partner 
organisations during the year. They 
reported a high level of satisfaction 
with the rate of Code implementation 
and Work Plan delivery. 
We are confident that the 2016 
Code is moving us all in the right 
direction. The rate of progress this 
year is very encouraging.
Collectively we believe a voluntary 
Code applied through a systems 
approach will enable us to 
demonstrate that together in 
partnership we are stepping up to our 
obligations and responsibilities as 
guardians and managers of our 
marine environment. The 2016 Code 
is our pathway.
This is a significant shift from the 
concerns being expressed in 2013. It 
reflects a process of careful review of the 
previous regime and consideration of the 
design and implementation of the co-
regulatory mechanism that now exists. 
While this occurred prior to the release of 
Government Expectations of Good 
Regulatory Practice in April 2017, the 
approach taken reflects key expectations 
expressed in that document. 
The expectations indicate that 
regulatory systems should be assets, not 
liabilities: i.e. they must deliver benefits 
that exceed their costs. They also 
emphasise the need to remove or redesign 
a regulatory system or component that 
isn’t delivering net benefits. While no 
quantitative cost-benefit assessment was 
undertaken in respect to the 2004 code, 
concerns raised led to the environmental 
scan. That scan highlighted problems and 
weaknesses which meant that the express 
intention, set out in the 2004 code, of 
‘securing the future safety of marine 
operations in New Zealand ports and 
harbours’ was apparently not being met 
(Maritime Safety Authority, 2004). 
The expectations describe the features 
of a regulatory system that is more likely 
to deliver durable outcomes. Those 
features include: clear objectives; 
flexibility of approach to accommodate 
the attitudes and needs of different 
regulated parties; proportionality, fairness 
and equity in the treatment of regulated 
parties; obligations set out clearly; and 
scope to evolve. These are all features of 
the design and implementation of the co-
regulatory mechanism that now exists; 
and, importantly, they are features that 
have arisen from a co-design process 
involving government regulator (central 
and local government working together) 
and regulated party engagement.  
1 The Maritime New Zealand Authority is the board of 
Maritime New Zealand, the Crown entity tasked with 
undertaking safety, security, marine protection and other 
functions in a way which contributes to the aim of achieving 
an integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable transport 
system.
2 This is a reference to Ezekiel, chapter 27 in the Bible.
3 This article was kindly provided by Anne Carnegie, secretary, 
International Harbour Masters’ Association, PO Box 3111, 
Lancing, BN15 5BQ, United Kingdom.
4 A forum that existed within the network of regional councils 
at the time to bring together harbourmasters and engage 
with other key players such as marine managers, pilots and 
Maritime New Zealand; it has more recently been replaced 
by the Navigational Safety Special Interest Group, which has 
a similar purpose.
5 Indeed, it is this situation that had effectively provided some 
comfort to Maritime New Zealand that it could focus on other 
priorities.
6 The term ‘environmental scan’ is used to refer to a quick 
assessment of what is working and not working for those 
engaged in a programme; environment in this context means 
the broader setting.
7 This was probably a moot point as it was clear that the 
amendments to the Maritime Transport Act were not directly 
contemplated as making the code mandatory, although they 
did include a provision that enables the director of Maritime 
New Zealand to impose conditions on port operators should 
evidence support the need for that.
8 The Port Company Chief Executive Group coordinates 
common interests of the port companies in relation to 
government.
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Table 2: Key design features flowing from consideration of recommendations
recommendation design features
Address outstanding 
SMS ‘approvals’
The first step taken was to address outstanding SMS ‘approvals’. An early decision was to acknowledge that 
referring to ‘approvals’ did not fit comfortably with a voluntary, collaborative approach. This action was reframed 
as providing ‘confirmation’ to port company and council chief executives that the SMS met the requirements of the 
code (at that point, the 2004 version). In support of the intent of recommendation 1, as a trial a joint port, council 
and Maritime New Zealand working group was established. This working group established panels of experts to 
‘confirm’ the SMSs that had not previously been ‘approved’. The experts were drawn from each of the partner 
groups (ports, councils and Maritime New Zealand). 
Revive and strengthen 
joint commitment of 
the Port and Harbour 
Marine Safety Code
In August 2016, reflecting the success of the trial approach to addressing outstanding SMS ‘confirmations’, an 
MoU was signed by representatives of port company chief executives and regional council chief executives (that 
were listed individually in the MoU) and the chief executive/director of Maritime New Zealand (Maritime New 
Zealand, 2017a). While not legally binding, this commits the parties to principles of tripartite joint ownership 
of the code, voluntary adoption of mutually agreed standards, collaboration, commitment of human resources to 
support delivery of an agreed work plan, and joint funding of a secretariat. Critically, the MoU is clear that there is 
no constraint on the ability of councils or Maritime New Zealand to carry out their regulatory functions.  
Update the code and 
supporting guidelines
Parallel with the trial, and the development and signing of the MoU, the 2004 code was refreshed and the 2016 
version released. The 2016 code provides clarity in respect to its objective (‘to ensure the safe management of 
ships navigating in New Zealand ports and harbours, including the prevention of: injury to people or loss of life, and 
damage to the environment, particularly to the marine environment, but also to property’).
    It also establishes clearly who the 2016 code applies to, what it covers, where it should be applied, the 
respective responsibilities and accountabilities of the parties to the code, and its relationship to legislative 
requirements. 
    Consistent with the MoU, the 2016 code established a tripartite steering group, working group and a jointly 
funded secretariat. It established processes for joint peer review panels and confirmed that code activities did not 
prevent councils and Maritime New Zealand from independent exercise of their regulatory functions. The secretariat 
and working group have the task of developing a work plan for consideration by the steering group, including a 
schedule of SMS reviews, and review and development of supporting guidelines. Resources for these activities are 
provided by the partner groups. 
Improve the code’s 
operational efficiency
The key barrier to efficiency had been the difficulty Maritime New Zealand had in assigning resources to 
undertake 2004 code-related activities. It was also noted that the leadership qualities and maritime knowledge of 
harbourmasters had some bearing on how efficiently tasks could be carried out. 
    The MoU and the 2016 code establish clear commitment to resources and sharing of the work load across all 
parties to ensure efficient execution of code tasks. Involvement of panels of experts supports the development of 
leadership and knowledge sharing among all code participants. 
    The 2016 code also addresses potential conflicts of interest. Noting that in some cases harbourmasters are 
employees of port companies in addition to having harbourmaster responsibilities, the code provides guidance to 
ensure the independence of the exercise of harbourmaster functions. 
    Conflicts of interest may also occur should a review panel member (for example, from Port ‘A’) have access to 
information that is commercially sensitive when reviewing the SMS of another port (Port ‘B’), particularly where 
ports A and B are in direct competition. This matter is addressed in the assignment of panel members, including a 
requirement to protect and respect commercial confidentiality.  
Collect and 
communicate 
evidence of the code’s 
effectiveness
The code establishes:
• a requirement for review panels to report their findings to the working group;
• a requirement for annual self-assessments by ports and councils, which are to be provided to the working 
group; 
• the need for the development of performance standards to measure the effectiveness of the code. 
The information provided from these processes is used to prepare an annual report on the effectiveness of the code. 
     The MoU also provides for national meetings of 2016 code participants and stakeholders to assess national 
performance of the code. The inaugural national forum took place in July 2017 in Wellington. The first annual 
report was released in September 2017. 
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